FIRE AND BLAST MODELING

Extensive experience in the modelling and simulation of fire and blast events, through both analysis and physical testing. Petroneering can perform a fully integrated design process, with the fire and blast modelling and simulation tools, which allow for the incorporation of all system components that will influence the outcome of a fire or blast scenario including gas dispersion, ventilation systems, fire detection and suppression systems and blast loading structural assessment.

 

 

CONSEQUENCE MODELING

Utilized to analyze, assess and forecast the effects of accident from either natural and techological sources on population, resources and infrastructure. The consequences models are explicitly used to predict the distance to specified end-points for representative high-consequence scenarios. Understanding how to mitigate consequences provides effective resource allocation and mobilization. 

 

 

RISK ASSESSMENT

Providing specific services within process safety discipline for wide range area including: Planning, Management, Analysis and Design. Process Safety involves the design of systems that are safe and fit for purpose. Process Safety as a discipline focuses on identifying potential hazard associated with a system(s). and either eliminating them, or reducing their risk to a level that is acceptable.

 

 

HAZOP/HAZID FACILITATION

Highly-seasoned in facilitating risk assessment workshops in the oil & gas industries. We have established procedures that can be tailored to ensure that the clients objectives for the workshop will be met. The workshops that can be conducted by Petroneering cover PHA, HAZID, HAZOP, and custom process safety.

 

 

MAJOR HAZARD FACILITY (MHF) AUDITS

Referring to a systematic and independent examination of a facility: at which hazardous chemicals are present or likely to be present in a quantity that exceeds their threshold quantity that is determined by the regulator to be a major hazard facility. 

 

 

SAFETY CASE DEVELOPMENT

Containing a structured argument demonstrating that the evidence contained therein is sufficient to show that the system is safe.

 

The objectives are to (1) apply safety case best practice; (2) retain existing legacy evidence and arguments (using black box approach); (3) manage "need to know"; (4) handle complexity to make the safety case comprehensible while still being comprehensive; (5) focus on dependencies between parts of the safety case; and (6) ensure context is considered and consistent.